New Divorce Law in UK – 2026 Update

Key Points

• Divorce in England and Wales is governed by the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, as amended by the Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Act 2020, which removed fault from the process and came into force on 6 April 2022.
• The sole ground for divorce is the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. Since April 2022, a written statement to that effect is all the court requires: no evidence of conduct, adultery, or separation is needed.
• A financial settlement in divorce is not automatic. The court divides assets by applying the discretionary criteria in section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, shaped by three judicial principles: need, sharing, and compensation.
• In December 2024, the Law Commission published a scoping report concluding that the financial remedies framework requires reform, citing the excessive breadth of judicial discretion and the resulting unpredictability for parties without legal advice.
• Attending a Mediation Information and Assessment Meeting (MIAM) is mandatory before issuing most court applications in family proceedings. Tighter MIAM rules introduced in April 2024 make it harder to bypass that requirement.

Divorce in England and Wales is a structured legal process with a clear statutory foundation. Since 6 April 2022, neither party is required to assign blame for the breakdown of the marriage: a written statement that the marriage has irretrievably broken down is, in law, conclusive.

That change, introduced by the Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Act 2020, was the most significant reform to divorce law since the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. The 2020 Act reformed the route to ending a marriage. How assets, property, pensions, and income are divided on separation remains governed by the same 1973 framework, interpreted through decades of case law. For many people, the financial settlement is the most contested and far-reaching part of the process.

This guide explains how divorce works from start to finish: the legal framework, the process itself, how finances are resolved, what the courts consider, and what is changing. It applies only to England and Wales. Scotland and Northern Ireland operate different legal systems.

Divorce Law in England and Wales

The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973

The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973) remains the central statute governing divorce, judicial separation, and financial provision on the ending of a marriage in England and Wales. It consolidated earlier legislation, including the Divorce Reform Act 1969, which first introduced irretrievable breakdown as the sole ground for divorce. For nearly 50 years, that ground required a petitioner to establish one of five facts: adultery, unreasonable behaviour, desertion, two years’ separation with the other party’s consent, or five years’ separation without the other party’s consent.

Section 25 of the MCA 1973 sets out the criteria the court must apply when deciding what financial orders to make. It requires the court to have regard to all the circumstances of the case, with the welfare of any minor children as the first consideration. The section then lists eight specific factors: the income, earning capacity, and financial resources of each party; their respective financial needs, obligations, and responsibilities; the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage; the age of each party and duration of the marriage; any physical or mental disability; contributions made by each party, including contributions to the welfare of the family; conduct, where it would be inequitable to disregard it; and the value of any benefits, including pension benefits, that a party would lose on divorce.

The Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Act 2020

The Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Act 2020 received Royal Assent on 25 June 2020 and came into force on 6 April 2022. It amended the MCA 1973 to replace the requirement to establish a factual basis for irretrievable breakdown with a simple requirement to provide a statement that the marriage has irretrievably broken down. That statement is, by statute, conclusive: the court must treat it as proof and must make a divorce order. A respondent cannot contest the divorce itself, except on narrow grounds such as a challenge to the court’s jurisdiction or the validity of the marriage.

The Act introduced two significant procedural changes. First, it created the option of a joint application, allowing both spouses to apply together where the decision to divorce is mutual. Second, it imposed a minimum period of 20 weeks between the start of proceedings and any application for a conditional order, replacing the approach under which a decree nisi could follow relatively quickly after the petition. Terminology also changed: the divorce petition became a divorce application; the petitioner became the applicant; the decree nisi became a conditional order; and the decree absolute became a final order.

The Civil Partnership Act 2004

Same-sex couples who formed a civil partnership dissolve it through a parallel process governed by the Civil Partnership Act 2004, as amended by the 2020 Act. The legal principles and procedural steps closely mirror those for divorce, and references to divorce in this guide apply equally to civil partnership dissolution unless the context indicates otherwise.

The Divorce Process: Step by Step

To apply for divorce in England and Wales, the applicant must have been married for at least one year. The application can be made online via the HMCTS portal or on paper. The respondent has 14 days to acknowledge service. After 20 weeks from the issue of proceedings, the applicant may apply for a conditional order. After a further six weeks and one day from the date of the conditional order, the applicant may apply for a final order, which legally ends the marriage.

Financial matters and arrangements for children are separate processes that run alongside the divorce but are not resolved by the divorce order itself. A conditional order can be made before any financial settlement is reached. Many solicitors advise against applying for the final order until the financial position is clear, because certain rights, particularly in relation to pensions and inheritance, are affected once the marriage formally ends.

Recent Changes in UK Divorce Law

The End of Fault-Based Divorce

Before April 2022, obtaining a divorce without blaming the other party required waiting two years if the respondent agreed, or five years if they did not. That created a genuine practical problem. Couples who had grown apart, but whose separation did not involve conduct serious enough to sustain a behavioural petition, faced either years of delay or the dishonest inflation of complaints. The case of Owens v Owens [2018] UKSC 41 brought that problem into sharp public focus.

Mrs Owens filed for divorce in 2015, relying on section 1(2)(b) of the MCA 1973, the so-called unreasonable behaviour fact. Her petition listed 27 examples of Mr Owens’s conduct. The trial judge found the examples ‘flimsy’ and dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeal upheld that decision. The Supreme Court, though acknowledging the result was deeply unsatisfactory, confirmed that the courts below had correctly applied the statute. Lord Wilson noted that he could not ‘write the statutory provision out of the Act’. Mrs Owens was required to remain married until she could rely on a different ground.

The judgment drew widespread criticism and gave legislative momentum to what became the 2020 Act. Under the current law, neither the conduct of the respondent nor any agreed period of separation is a precondition for divorce. The 20-week waiting period is procedural rather than punitive. By 2023, 74.2% of all divorces in England and Wales were granted under the 2020 Act, up from just 9.2% in 2022.

Joint Applications

Before April 2022, only one party could be the petitioner; the other was always cast as a respondent. That framing, even in amicable cases, put the parties in an adversarial posture from the outset. Joint applications allow both spouses to confirm together that their marriage has broken down irretrievably, without either being positioned as the wronged party. By 2023, 26.7% of divorces granted under the new legislation were joint applications, demonstrating meaningful take-up of the new mechanism.

Strengthened MIAM Requirements in 2024

Under section 10(1) of the Children and Families Act 2014, applicants must attend a Mediation Information and Assessment Meeting (MIAM) before making certain applications to the family court, unless an exemption applies. An MIAM is a meeting with an accredited mediator to assess whether mediation or another form of non-court dispute resolution is suitable.

In April 2024, amendments to the Family Procedure Rules substantially strengthened MIAM requirements. Judges can now adjourn proceedings where mediation is a viable option. The thresholds for exemptions, including those for domestic abuse and urgency, were tightened, making it harder for applicants to bypass attendance. Mediators must discuss the full range of non-court dispute-resolution options, including arbitration and collaborative law, not just mediation. Those directions reflect a policy position that has been consistent since at least 2014: courts should be a last resort for separating families, not the first step.

The Law Commission Scoping Report on Financial Remedies

On 18 December 2024, the Law Commission published a scoping report on the law governing financial remedies on divorce and dissolution. The Commission was asked whether the current law requires reform. Its conclusion was that it does, because the current framework does not provide a cohesive basis for parties to expect a fair and certain outcome.

The report identified the excessive breadth of judicial discretion under section 25 of the MCA 1973 as the central problem. Section 25 lists eight factors for the court to consider, but provides neither a statutory objective nor guidance on the weight to attach to each factor. Over the decades, the courts developed the three guiding principles of need, sharing, and compensation through case law rather than statute, creating a system whose outcomes are difficult to predict. That difficulty has a particular impact on litigants in person, who now form a substantial proportion of family court applicants.

The Commission proposed four models for reform, ranging from a codification exercise that would translate existing case law into statute, to a more structured approach with a statutory objective and clearer guidance on the weight to be given to each section 25 factor. The report makes no formal recommendations. It is a scoping exercise that will inform whether a full Law Commission project is launched. Legislative change remains some way off, but the report sets the terms of a debate that practitioners have been having for years.

Financial Settlement on Divorce

Why a Financial Order Matters

A divorce order, whether conditional or final, does not resolve any financial claims between the parties. The financial ties created by marriage continue until a court issues a financial order. Without such an order, either party can make financial claims against the other at any point in the future, including on the death of the other. Many people do not discover this until they have already remarried or moved on, by which point the consequences can be severe.

Even where spouses reach an informal agreement, that agreement is not enforceable unless it is converted into a court order. A consent order, a financial agreement that both parties have signed and that the court has approved, is the standard mechanism for achieving a clean break. Before approving the agreement, the court must be satisfied that its terms are fair.

The Section 25 Framework

When parties cannot agree, the court decides financial provision by applying section 25 of the MCA 1973. The section requires the court to consider all the circumstances, with the welfare of any children under 18 as the first consideration. Case law has organised the eight listed factors around three broader principles. The principle of need addresses housing and income requirements for both parties and any children; it is the dominant consideration where the asset pool is modest. The sharing principle holds that, where resources exceed needs, matrimonial assets should be divided equally unless there is a good reason to depart from equality. The compensation principle applies when one party has suffered a significant economic disadvantage due to decisions made during the marriage.

The Equality Principle

In White v White [2000] UKHL 54, a farming couple with assets of approximately £4.6 million divorced after a long marriage. At first instance, Mrs White received approximately £980,000, calculated on a needs basis. The Court of Appeal increased the award. The House of Lords upheld that increase and introduced the yardstick of equality: a judge making a financial order should check the proposed award against equality and should be able to explain any departure from it.

The judgment did not mandate a 50/50 split. What it established is that non-financial contributions, such as homemaking and child-rearing, carry equal weight to financial contributions. A spouse who gave up career progression to raise children is not to be treated as having contributed less than the spouse who ran the business. That principle remains central to financial remedy law today. It overturned the previous approach under which a financially weaker spouse received only what the court considered their ‘reasonable requirements’, regardless of the size of the joint asset pool.

Applying the yardstick of equality does not mean equality is presumed. Departure from equality is common, and the section 25 criteria justify it.

Conduct in Financial Proceedings

Section 25(2)(g) of the MCA 1973 allows the court to take conduct into account where it would be ‘inequitable to disregard it’. The threshold is deliberately high. The family court is not a forum for moral adjudication of marital behaviour, and infidelity will not affect the financial outcome. Dissipation of assets, extreme violence, and serious criminal conduct have all been held to cross the threshold; poor behaviour in the marriage has not.

The recent decision in MRU v ECR (Financial Remedies) [2025] EWFC 218 (B) illustrates the court’s approach. The respondent’s criminal convictions and associated incarceration had direct financial consequences, including a material impact on the care of the couple’s children. The court found it could not in fairness, disregard that conduct when distributing the assets. The applicant received 100% of the liquid funds to purchase housing for himself and his children; a pension-sharing order transferred 98% of his Standard Life pension to the respondent to achieve equality across the whole award. The respondent was also ordered to pay costs of £7,200. Conduct shaped the entire structure of the award, not merely its margins.

Nuptial Agreements

Prenuptial and postnuptial agreements are not automatically binding in English law, but since the Supreme Court’s decision in Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42, they carry substantial weight. The test is that the court should give effect to a nuptial agreement that each party freely entered into with a full appreciation of its implications, unless it would not be fair to hold the parties to their agreement in the circumstances prevailing at the time of the order. The Supreme Court dismissed Mr Granatino’s appeal by eight to one, upholding a prenuptial agreement signed in Germany before the marriage.

For a nuptial agreement to receive significant weight, it should be concluded well before the marriage, both parties should have received independent legal advice, there should be full financial disclosure, and the terms should not leave one party in a position of need. The Law Commission recommended in 2014 that qualifying nuptial agreements should be made binding by statute, but that recommendation has not been implemented.

Pensions on Divorce

Pension assets are frequently the most substantial financial resource in a marriage after the family home, yet they are often undervalued or overlooked during the separation process. The court has three tools available. A pension sharing order transfers a percentage of the pension credit to the other party, giving the recipient a separate pension interest in their own right. A pension attachment order redirects some or all of the payments from one party’s pension when they fall due. An offsetting arrangement gives one party a larger share of other assets rather than a pension share.

The value of a pension for sharing purposes is usually its cash equivalent transfer value (CETV), which the scheme administrator provides on request. Both parties must obtain pension valuations before the court will make pension provision. In complex cases involving defined benefit schemes, where the CETV may not accurately reflect the pension’s true income value, expert actuarial evidence may be required.

Types of Financial Order

The court can make a range of financial orders under the MCA 1973. Property adjustment orders transfer the legal interest in a property from one party to the other, or order its sale. Lump sum orders require one party to pay a specified amount. Periodical payment orders provide ongoing financial support, either for a fixed period or an open-ended term. Pension sharing orders deal with pension assets. A clean break order formally ends all financial claims between the parties, preventing either from making future claims. The court is required to consider whether a clean break is appropriate in every case.

What do you do to make the divorce process easier

The procedural simplicity of the current divorce process can create a misleading impression of how straightforward separation is. Filing an application for divorce is genuinely straightforward. Resolving the financial and parenting consequences is a different matter.

• Do not apply for the final order before the financial position is resolved. Once the marriage formally ends, certain pension entitlements and inheritance rights are lost. Many solicitors recommend staying at the conditional order stage until the court approves a consent order.
• Attend a MIAM before issuing any application to court. Since the April 2024 rule changes, courts have taken compliance more seriously, and exemptions are harder to establish. Even where mediation is ultimately unsuitable, the MIAM is still required.
• Obtain pension valuations early. The CETV must be no more than 12 months old when the court makes a pension sharing order. Where defined benefit or public sector pensions are involved, specialist advice is advisable at an early stage given the complexity of valuation.
• Disclose all assets fully and honestly. Non-disclosure can lead to adverse inferences being drawn and, in extreme cases, to orders being set aside after the event: see Sharland v Sharland [2015] UKSC 60, where the Supreme Court set aside a consent order because the husband had concealed plans for an IPO of his company.
• Consider a nuptial agreement before remarriage. The Radmacher framework gives a properly constructed agreement significant, potentially decisive, weight. Those entering a second marriage with substantial assets or children from a previous relationship should seek advice before the wedding.
• Do not confuse reaching an agreement with having a financial order. An agreement between the parties, even if written down and signed, is not enforceable without a court order. Formalising the agreement as a consent order is the only way to achieve certainty and finality.
• Periodical payments orders can be varied if circumstances change substantially, but property adjustment orders and clean break orders cannot be varied once made. The permanence of a financial order is one reason to take sufficient time to reach a settlement that genuinely reflects both parties’ long-term positions.

Policy and Future Direction

The December 2024 Law Commission scoping report is the most substantial development in financial remedies law in a generation. The Commission’s conclusion that the current law does not provide a cohesive framework for fair and certain outcomes reflects a longstanding professional consensus. Three structural problems are identified: the absence of a statutory objective within section 25; the way case law has developed those statutory provisions in terms that are opaque to litigants in person; and the difficulty in predicting what the courts will treat as ‘needs’, a concept that varies enormously depending on the lifestyle and expectations of the parties.

The four models for reform range from a codification exercise, translating existing case law into statute to make it accessible, to a more structured approach with a statutory objective and clearer guidance on the weight to be given to each section 25 factor. The central question is whether the current broad judicial discretion, which produces outcomes tailored to individual circumstances but also creates uncertainty, should give way to a more rule-based approach that prioritises predictability. The Government has not signalled which approach it will pursue. A full Law Commission project, if authorised, would take several years to complete.

On the process side, policy since 2014 has consistently favoured diverting family disputes away from courts and towards mediation and other forms of non-court dispute resolution. The expansion of the Family Mediation Voucher Scheme and the tightening of MIAM exemptions in 2024 are both expressions of that direction. Whether court resources are sufficient to support it, given sustained increases in litigants in person, is a contested question that the profession continues to raise.

Frequently Asked Questions

How long does a divorce take in England and Wales?

The minimum timeframe under the current law is approximately six months: 20 weeks from the issue of proceedings to the application for a conditional order, then a further six weeks and one day before the final order can be applied for. A straightforward, uncontested divorce in which financial matters are agreed can often be concluded in around six to eight months. Contested financial proceedings, incomplete documentation, and delays in the court system can significantly extend that timeline. The financial remedy process, if it proceeds to a final hearing, can add a year or more to the overall duration.

Does it matter who applies for the divorce?

Under the current law, there is no longer any strategic advantage in issuing proceedings first, and a respondent cannot contest the divorce on the ground that the marriage has not broken down. The main practical difference is that the applicant typically pays the court fee, currently £593 for an online application, though fees are subject to change. In joint applications, both parties share the process equally from the outset.

Can I proceed if my spouse refuses to engage?

Yes, a sole applicant can proceed even where the respondent does not acknowledge service or participate in the proceedings. Where the respondent cannot be located or refuses to acknowledge service, the applicant can apply to the court for alternative service or deemed service. The respondent’s refusal to engage does not prevent the divorce from proceeding; it may, though, complicate the financial proceedings and any arrangements for children.

Will the court always divide assets equally?

No, equality is a yardstick for assessing fairness rather than a presumption of outcome. The White v White yardstick requires a judge to check the proposed award against equality and to explain any departure from it, but departure is common. Shorter marriages, substantial pre-marital assets, significant inherited wealth, and cases where resources are insufficient to meet the needs of both parties will all produce outcomes that are not an equal division. When children are involved, their need for stable housing is often the overriding consideration.

What is the difference between a separation agreement and a financial order?

A separation agreement is a contract between separating spouses setting out how they will manage their finances during the period of separation pending a formal divorce. It is not binding on the court and can be departed from if the court considers it unfair at the point of approving the eventual consent order. A financial order, whether by consent or after a contested hearing, is a court order and is fully enforceable. A separation agreement can be a useful practical arrangement, but it does not provide the finality or enforceability of a court-sealed order. Our guide to divorce financial settlements sets out how both mechanisms work in practice.